For the existence of the contingent universe must rest on something, and if it rested on some contingent being then that contingent being too would require some explanation of its existence.
Ultimately the decision is always yours.
If this proposition is true in world P, then it is also true in world P that "There is a true proposition. In the remainder of this section, I will argue that neither option seems to be true, and thus the MCA is not rationally acceptable. The question arises because a boxcar does not have the power to move itself.
That is, if God necessarily exists in the sense that if he exists, he exists in all possible worlds, it remains logically possible that God does not exist in any and all possible worlds.
However, you say, I think, that it is illegitimate to raise the question of what will explain the existence of any particular object. Further discussion is in Oppy Gasking uses this logic to assume that non-existence must be a disability.
How else could an explanation for C go? For no one who denies or doubts the existence of a being a greater than which is inconceivable, denies or doubts that if it did exist its nonexistence, either in reality or in the understanding, would be impossible.
But it is at least plausible to claim that, in each case, any even minimally rational person who has doubts about the claimed status of the conclusion of the argument will have exactly the same doubts about the claimed status of the premise.
It might have been the case that nothing existed at all. First, we might argue that even if a the MCA demonstrates the existence of at least one necessary being or makes belief in one reasonable and b it is rational to postulate only one necessary being, the MCA is not rationally acceptable because God is but one option out of a giant pool of possible supernatural beings, any one of which could be the required necessary being.
However, even those who accept principles of unrestricted composition—i. God also acts from his intentions Swinburne Any property entailed by a collection of God-properties is itself a God-property.
Thus, talk about an explanation for the ontologically noncontingent, or for an infinite collection of ontological contingents, seems incoherent.
A geologist does not suppose that he has explained why there should be rivers and mountains merely by pointing out that they are old. The most formidable handicap for a creator would be non-existence.The “victorious” modal ontological argument of Plantinga goes roughly as follows: Say that an entity possesses “maximal excellence” if and only if it is omnipotent, omnscient, and morally perfect.
Consequently, the modal ontological argument is a logical argument, but not an ontological argument in the sense of having any existential relevance. No philosophical argument for the existence of God, can be initiated with a definition of God, because God is not within human experience.
The Modal Cosmological argument It is said that all philosophy begins in wonder; and Leibniz was surely right in insisting that the most fundamental thing to wonder at is why anything exists at all. The cosmological argument is the argument that the existence of the world or universe is strong evidence for the existence of a God who created it.
The existence of the universe, the argument claims, stands in need of explanation, and the only adequate explanation of its existence is that it was created by God.
The modal cosmological argument or “argument from contingency” is the argument from the contingency of the world or universe to the existence of God. The argument from contingency is the most prominent form of cosmological argument historically.
The Leibnizian cosmological argument is "modal" because it is predicated on a distinction between contingent and necessary things.
 This issue came up in the famous debate between the Frederick Copleston and Bertrand Russell.Download